Judgment, delay in pronouncing of

AIR 2001 SC 3173

Para 2: In 1961 a learned judge of the Patna High Court expressed his anguish when a magistrate took nine months to pronounce a judgment. The words used 'by him for expressing his judicial wrath is the following :

"The magistrate who cannot find time to write Judgement within reasonable time after hearing arguments ought not do any judicial work at all. This Court strongly disapproves the magistrates making such a tremendous delay in the delivery of his judgments;"

Para 3: Now when two judges of the Patna High Court took two years for pronouncing a Judgment after concluding arguments when the parties were languishing in jail, the counsel appearing in this Court in challenge of the said Judgment asked in unison whether the exhortation made by the Patna High Court in 1961 is not intended to apply to the High Court.

Para 6: If delay in pronouncing judgments occurred on the part of the judges of the subordinate judiciary the whip of the High Court studded with supervisory and administrative authority could be used and it had been used quite often to chide them and sometimes to take action against the erring judicial officers. But what happens when the High Court judges do not pronounce judgments after lapse of several months, and perhaps even years since completion of arguments? The Constitution did not provide anything in that area presumably because the architects of the Constitution believed that no High Court judge would cause such long and distressing delays. Such expectation of the makers of the Constitution remained unsullied during the early period of the post-Constitution years. But unfortunately, the later years have shown slackness on the part of a few judges of the superior Courts in India with the result that once arguments in a lis concluded before them the records remain consigned to hibernation. Judges themselves normally forget the details of the facts and niceties of the legal points advanced. Sometimes the interval is so long that the judges forget even the fact that such a case is pending with them expecting judicial verdict. Though it is an unpleasant fact, it is a stark reality .

Para 7: Should the situation continue to remain so helpless for all concerned. The Apex Court made an exhortation in 1976 through a Judgment which is reported as R. C. Sharma V/s. UOI, ( 1976) 3 SCC 574 for expediting delivery of judgments. I too wish to repeat those words as follows :

"Nevertheless an unreasonable delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgment, unless explained by exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, is highly undesirable even when written arguments are submitted. It is not unlikely that some points which the litigant considers important may have escaped notice. But, what is more important is that litigants must have complete confidence in the results of litigation. This confidence tends to be shaken if there is excessive delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgments."

Para 8: Quarter of a century has elapsed thereafter but the situation, instead of improving has only worsened. We understand that many cases remain in area of "judgment reserved" for long periods. It is heartening that most of the judges of the High Courts are discharging their duties by expeditiously pronouncing judgments.

But it is disheartening that a handful of few are unmindful of their obligation and the oath of office they have solemnly taken as they cause such inordinate delay in pronouncing judgments. It is in the above background, after bestowing deep thoughts with a sense of commitment, that we have decided to chalk out some remedial measures to be mentioned in this Judgement as instructions.

Para 9: Sethi, J. has enumerated them succinctly as follows :

(i) The Chief Justices of the High Courts may issue appropriate directions to the Registry that in a case where the Judgment is reserved and is pronounced later, a column be added in the Judgment where, on the first page, after the cause-title date of reserving the Judgment and date of pronouncing it be separately mentioned by the Court officer concerned.

(ii) That Chief Justices of the High Courts, on their administrative side, should direct the Court Officers/Readers of the various benches in the High Courts to furnish every month the list of cases in the matters where the judgments reserved are not pronounced within the period of that month.

(iii) On noticing that after conclusion of the arguments the Judgment is not pronounced within a period of two months the concerned Chief Justice shall draw the attention of the Bench concerned to the pending matter. The Chief Justice may also see the desirability of circulating the statement of such cases in which the judgments have not been pronounced within a period of six weeks from the date of conclusion of the arguments amongst the judges of the High Court for their information. Such communication be conveyed as confidential and in a sealed cover .

(iv) Where a Judgment is not pronounced within three months from the date of reserving Judgment any of the parties in the case is permitted to file an application in the High Court with prayer for early judgment. Such application, as and when filed, shall be listed before the bench concerned within two days excluding the intervening holidays.

(v) If the judgment, for any reason, is not pronounced within a period of six months any of the parties of the said lis shall be entitled to move an application before the Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to withdraw the said case and to make it over to any other bench for fresh arguments. It is open to the Chief Justice to grant the said prayer or to pass any other order as he deems fit in the circumstances.

Para 10: I have chosen to reiterate the above instructions in this separate Judgment only for providing added emphasis to them. I make it clear that if the Chief Justice of a High Court thinks that more effective measures can be evolved by him for slashing down the interval between conclusion of arguments and delivery of Judgment in that particular Court, it is open to him to do so as substitute for the measures suggested by us hereinbefore. But until such measures are evolved by the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court we expect that the measures suggested above would hold the field. I may also mention that the above enumerated measures are intended to remain only until such time as the Parliament would enact measures to deal with this problem.

Para 13: The inordinate, unexplained and negligent delay in pronouncing the Judgment is alleged to have actually negatived the right of appeal conferred upon the convicts under the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure. It is submitted that such a delay is not only against the provisions of law but in fact infringes the right of personal liberty guaranteed by Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. Any procedure or course of action which does not ensure a reasonable quick adjudication has been termed to be unjust. Such a course is stated to be contrary to the maxim "Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit", that an act of the Court shall prejudice none.

Para 14: The prevalence of such a practice and horrible situation in some of the High Courts in the country has necessitated the desirability of considering the effect of such delay on the rights of the litigant public. Though reluctantly, yet for preserving and strengthening the belief of the people in the institution of the judiciary, we have decided to consider this aspect and to give appropriate directions.

Para 15: It has been held time and again that justice should not only be done but should also appear to have been done. Similarly whereas justice delayed is justice denied, justice withheld is even worst than that. This Court in Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot V/s. State of Maharashtra, (1978) 3 SCC 544 observed that procedure contemplated under Art. 21 of the Constitution means "fair and reasonable procedure" which comports with civilised norms like natural justice rooted firm in community consciousness not primitive processual barbarity nor legislated normative mockery.

Right of appeal in a criminal case culminating in conviction was held to be the basis of the civilized jurisprudence. Conferment of right of appeal to meet the requirement of Art. 21 of the Constitution cannot be made a fraught by protracting the pronouncement of Judgement for reasons which are not attributable either to the litigant or to the State or to the legal profession. Delay in disposal of an appeal on account of inadequate number of judges, insufficiency of infrastructure, strike of lawyers and the circumstances attributable to the State is understandable but once the entire process of participation in justice delivery system is over and only thing to be done is the pronouncement of judgment, no excuse can be found to further delay for adjudication of the rights of the parties, particularly when it affects any of their rights conferred by the Constitution under Part- III.

Para 16: Learned counsel for the appellants has referred to the judgments in Surender Nath Sarkar V/s. Emperor, Jagarnath Singh V/s. Francis Kharia, Sohagiya V/s. Ram Briksh Mahto, 1961 BLJR 282 to show that only on the .ground of delay in rendering the Judgment for the period ranging from six months to ten months, the High Courts had held such judgments bad in law and set them aside. In R. C. Sharma V/s. Union of India, (1976) 3 SCC 574 this Court, after noticing that the Civil Procedure Code did not provide a time limit in delivery of a Judgement held :

"Nevertheless, we think that an unreasonable delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of a Judgement unless explained by exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, is highly undesirable even when written arguments are submitted. It is not unlikely that some points which the litigant considers important may have escaped notice. But, what is more important is that litigants must have complete confidence in the results of litigation. This confidence tends to be shaken if there is excessive delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgment. Justice, as we have often observed, must not only be done but must\ manifestly appear to be done."

Para 17: In Bhagwan Das Fateh Chand Daswani V/s. H.P.A. International, (2000) 2 SCC 13 this Court observed that "a long delay in delivering the Judgement gives rise to unnecessary speculation in the minds of parties to a case". This Court in various cases including Hussainara Khatoon V/s. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, ( 1980) 1 SCC 81, Hus-sainara Khatoon V/s. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 98, A. R. Antulay V/s. R. S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225, Kartar Singh V/s. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569, Raj Deo Sharma V/s. State of Bihar, ( 1998) 7 SCC 507, Raj Deo Sharma (II) V/s. State of Bihar, (1999) 7 SCC 604 and Akhtari Bi V/s. State of M.P., (2001) 4 SCC 355 has in unambiguous terms, held that "the right of speedy trial to be part of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India".

Para 18: Adverse effect of the problem of not pronouncing the reserved judgments within a reasonable time was considered by the Arrears Committee constituted by the Government of India on the recommendation of the Chief Justices' Conference. In its report of 1989-90 Chapter VIII, the Committee recommended that reserved judgments should ordinarily be pronounced within a period of six weeks from the date of conclusion of the arguments. If, however, a reserved Judgment is not pronounced for a period of three months from the date of the conclusion of the arguments, the Chief Justice was recommended to be authorized to either post the case for delivering Judgment in open Court or withdraw the case and post it for disposal before an appropriate bench.

Para 19: The intention of the Legislature regarding pronouncement of judgments can be inferred from the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (1) of Section 353 of the Code provides that the Judgement in every trial in any criminal Court of original jurisdiction, shall be pronounced in open Court immediately after the conclusion of the trial or on some subsequent time for which due notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders.

The words "some subsequent time" mentioned in Section 353 contemplates the passing of the Judgement without undue delay, as delay in the pronouncement of Judgement is opposed to the principle of law. Such subsequent time can at the most be stretched to a period of six weeks and not beyond that time in any case. The pronouncement of judgments in the civil case should not be permitted to go beyond two months.

Para 20: It is true, that for the High Courts, no period for pronouncement of Judgment is contemplated either under the Civil Procedure Code or the Criminal Procedure Code, but as the pronouncement of the Judgment is a part of justice dispensation system, it has to be without delay. In a country like ours where people consider the judges only second to God, efforts be made to strengthen that belief of the common man. Delay in disposal of the cases facilitates the people to raise eye-brows, sometime genuinely which, if not checked, may shake the confidence of the people in the judicial system. A time has come when the judiciary itself has to assert for preserving its stature, respect and regards for the attainment of the Rule of Law.

For the fault of a few, the glorious and glittering name of the judiciary cannot be permitted to be made ugly. It is the policy and purpose of law, to have speedy justice for which efforts are required to be made to come to the expectation of the society of ensuring speedy, untainted and unpolluted justice.

Para 21: Under the prevalent circumstances in some of the High Courts, I feel it appropriate to provide some guidelines regarding the pronouncement of judgments which, I am sure, shall be followed by all concerned, being the mandate of this Court. Such guidelines, as for present, are as under :

(i) The Chief Justices of the High Courts may issue appropriate directions to the Registry that in a case where the Judgment is reserved and is pronounced later, a column be added in the Judgement where, on the first page, after the cause title date of reserving the Judgment and date of pronouncing it be separately mentioned by the Court officer concerned.

(ii) That Chief Justices of the High Courts, on their administrative side, should direct the Court Officers/Readers of the various Benches in the High Courts to furnish every month the list of cases in the matters where the judgments reserved are not pronounced within the period of that month.

(iii) On noticing that after conclusion of the arguments the Judgment is not pronounced within a period of two months, the concerned Chief Justice shall draw the attention of the Bench concerned to the pending matter. The Chief Justice may also see the desirability of circulating the statement of such cases in which the judgments have not been pronounced within a period of six weeks from the date of conclusion of the arguments amongst the judges of the High Court for their information. Such communication be conveyed as confidential and in a sealed cover.

(iv) Where a Judgment is not pronounced within three months, from the date of reserving it, any of the parties in the case is permitted to file an application in the High Court with prayer for early judgment. Such application, as and when filed, shall be listed before the Bench concerned within two days excluding the intervening holidays.

(v) If the judgment, for any reason, is not pronounced within a period of six months, any of the parties of the said lis shall be entitled to move an application before the Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to withdraw the said case and to make it over to any other bench for fresh arguments. It is open to the Chief Justice to grant the said prayer or to pass any other order as he deems fit in the circumstances.

Sandeep Jalan

Advocate

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