In G. Ramegowda, Major and Others V/s.
Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, 1988 2 SCC 142, this Court held:
"10. We
might, perhaps, deal with the latter submission of Shri Veerappa first. The
fact that the main appeals are themselves, in the meanwhile, disposed of
finally on the merits by the High Court would not by itself detract from and
bar the consideration of the correctness of the order condoning the delays.
This is an instance of what are called "dependent orders" and if the
order excusing the delays is itself set aside in these appeals, the further
exercise, made in the meanwhile, by the High Court finally disposing of the
appeals, would be rendered nugatory. The submission of Shri Veerappa is,
therefore, insubstantial."
28 We are, however, not oblivious
that the said proposition of law is not absolute, as has been noticed by a
Division Bench of this Court in Ajay Bansal V/s. Anup Mehta, 2007 2 SCC 275,
wherein it was held:
"14. A
decree passed subsequent to the refusal of leave to defend could either be
under Or. 37 R. 3(6) of the Code or it could be based on the affidavit evidence
on the side of the plaintiff and the documents produced or even based on oral
evidence formally proving, say, the execution of a promissory note by the
defendant. It may not be proper or necessary to apply the theory of
"dependent order" in such circumstances. For one, the theory may not
apply. Even if this Court were to set aside the order of the court below and
give the defendant leave to defend the suit, the decree that is passed may not
go automatically. It may have to be set aside. Secondly, the defendant can
always go to the court which passed the decree and move under R. 4 of Or. 37 of
the Code to reopen the decree."
The doctrine, therefore, must be applied
having regard to the fact situation obtaining in each case.
Sandeep
Jalan
Advocate
Law
Referencer: https://www.vakeelkanumber.com/
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