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Corresponding Powers, doctrine of


2008 (11) SCC 223


Para 2: The central question which arises for adjudication in this appeal is regarding the power, competence and authority of the Cantonment Board to levy entry tax on vehicles entering into the cantonment area.

Para 7: A bare reading of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 60 clearly reveals that the power to levy any tax is dependent upon and co-extensive with any such corresponding power which may vest in the municipality being relatable to and dependent upon legislative enactment concerning, governing or regulating the powers of such municipality.

Para 8: The Division Bench has rightly held that sub-sec. (1) of sec. 60 of the Cantonments Act, 1924 is not totally an independent provision by itself, in the sense that the power by itself has not been given to the Board to levy tax and the provision is related to and dependent upon any corresponding analogous provision in a legislative enactment of the municipality. In other words, if the municipality in an area has the power to levy tax under a relevant enactment, by virtue of the power created under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 60, the same power would vest in a Cantonment Board. In order to find out whether the Cantonment Board has any power to levy entry tax, it is necessary to find whether the municipality has similar power to levy entry tax.


Sandeep Jalan

Advocate

Law Referencer: https://www.vakeelkanumber.com/

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