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Dependent Order, doctrine of

2009 (1) SCC 240

In G. Ramegowda, Major and Others V/s. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, 1988 2 SCC 142, this Court held:

"10. We might, perhaps, deal with the latter submission of Shri Veerappa first. The fact that the main appeals are themselves, in the meanwhile, disposed of finally on the merits by the High Court would not by itself detract from and bar the consideration of the correctness of the order condoning the delays. This is an instance of what are called "dependent orders" and if the order excusing the delays is itself set aside in these appeals, the further exercise, made in the meanwhile, by the High Court finally disposing of the appeals, would be rendered nugatory. The submission of Shri Veerappa is, therefore, insubstantial."

28 We are, however, not oblivious that the said proposition of law is not absolute, as has been noticed by a Division Bench of this Court in Ajay Bansal V/s. Anup Mehta, 2007 2 SCC 275, wherein it was held:

"14. A decree passed subsequent to the refusal of leave to defend could either be under Or. 37 R. 3(6) of the Code or it could be based on the affidavit evidence on the side of the plaintiff and the documents produced or even based on oral evidence formally proving, say, the execution of a promissory note by the defendant. It may not be proper or necessary to apply the theory of "dependent order" in such circumstances. For one, the theory may not apply. Even if this Court were to set aside the order of the court below and give the defendant leave to defend the suit, the decree that is passed may not go automatically. It may have to be set aside. Secondly, the defendant can always go to the court which passed the decree and move under R. 4 of Or. 37 of the Code to reopen the decree."

The doctrine, therefore, must be applied having regard to the fact situation obtaining in each case.


Sandeep Jalan

Advocate

Law Referencer: https://www.vakeelkanumber.com/



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